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In 1985, the Victorian WorkCare workers’ compensation system was implemented,
replacing the private market in workers’ compensation insurance coverage with a state monopoly
fund scheme.  Unfortunately for Victorians, WorkCare proved to be unworkable; it gave rise to
increasing costs for employers, and “epidemic” of long-term disability claims, and huge unfunded
liabilities.  The WorkCare scheme was abandoned in 1992 in favor of WorkCover, which uses a
unique blend of private market and state monopoly principles.  Thus the Victorian Government
embarked in a comprehensive workers’ compensation reform plan, which began with the
introduction of WorkCover in December 1992.  
The WorkCover scheme restructured benefits, dispute resolution procedures, and
administration of the system.  Private insurers were incorporated into the system as “authorized
insurers” (essentially marketing and claim management agents). The premium system was revised,
introducing incentives for employers through experience ratings and other devices.  Additional
legislation in 1994 introduced the latest stage of Victoria’s transition, making a number of minor
adjustments in the schemes to further streamline claims management and rationalize incentives for
workers and employers.  (Victorian WorkCover Authority, 1993-94 Annual Report)
Thus far, the WorkCover scheme seems to be a great success (Boston Consulting, 1994). 
The last step in the reform plan involves possibly privatizing the scheme, once past liabilities are
fully funded and the fund itself it stable.  This could happen as early as 1997, based on the rapid
progress to date.  Since WorkCover began in December 1992, reported claims have dropped by
40 percent, and average premium levels have been reduced by 25 percent, accompanied by a
significant increase to weekly benefit levels.   Most significantly, the unfunded liability has been
reduced from 53 percent to zero, a swing of over $2 billion in less than three years. (Victorian
WorkCover Authority, 1994-95 Annual Report)
Because of this recent history, and because the pendulum seems to be swinging back
toward private market solutions in Victoria, as well as in Australia as a whole, there is an interest
in other models of workers’ compensation systems.  It seemed relevant to the authors if this
report to offer an outside perspective, one rooted in North American workers’ compensation
experience.  Our hope is that a review of U.S. and Canadian experiences, as highlighted in careful
reviews of two “successful” systems that have not wavered in their dedication to private market
and state monopoly principles respectively, might help inform the final debate on privatization in
Victoria.
Of course, there is no universally accepted definition of “public”or “private” workers’
compensation systems.  In North America, “public” would be taken to refer to a state of
provincial monopoly workers’ compensation insurance system.  “Private” would refer to some
version of a system that allows private insurance carriers to sell workers’ compensation insurance. 
In fact, of course, there is a continuum of systems and of system features that might affect the
basic judgement as to whether a particular system is more public or private in its orientation.  The
2question is how are different functions of the workers’ compensation system allocated among
government or public entities and private firms. 
It should be clear that we do not mean “private” to be synonymous with “market-
oriented,” although there are a number of obvious linkages between these abstract concepts in
workers’ compensation practice.  The Victorian WorkCover system is an example of a hybrid
system that uses private agents to sell the insurance, service the employers, and manage the
claims, but retains public ownership of the underwriting and rate-making functions.  In addition,
Victoria maintains extensive private incentives through an aggressive experience rating program. 
Thus, private economic incentives are a strong influence on the Victorian WorkCover system,
even though the fundamental underwriting and pricing functions are held in public hands.  
Among the issues we will consider here are the following.  Who carries the underwriting
(insurance) risk for workers’ compensation benefits?  How is workers’ compensation insurance
prices, and by whom?  What fundamental principles guide the insurance pricing system?  Who
monitors benefits for compliance with statutory requirements?  Are the availability of coverage
and the payment of insurers’ claims obligations guaranteed?  Is self-insurance allowed and, if so,
for whom?  How are incentives for prevention of accidents, and resulting workers’ compensation
claims, maintained?   What is the performance of the overall system?  In summary, how are these
questions answered and what so the answers reveal about how these responsibilities are allocated
among government agencies, other public entities and private firms? 
Since there are probably no universal statements that can be made about workers’
compensation systems, we have selected two “exemplars” of successful public or private workers’
compensation systems from North America to carry our analysis.  While this may distort some
comparisons, due to non-workers’ compensation system factors, it has the advantage of
grounding our judgement in a specific factual context that can also provide examples and
illustrations of basic principles.  
Relevance of North American Experience
There a number of reasons to believe that the lessons of North America may be relevant
for the decision makers in Victoria.  First, in a rough policy sense, the Canadian and U.S. models
of workers’ compensation bracket the Victorian WorkCover Authority scheme.  That is, the
Canadian systems represent one variant of the monopoly fund model that Victoria has been
moving away from since 1992, and the U.S. system represents one version of the privatized model
that Victoria experienced previously.  This is not to suggest that any specific North American
model would fit the Australian environment, but simply to argue that experiences in the same
“policy neighborhood” may be relevant.  In addition, it is very clear that Australia, Canada, and
the United States share a great deal of common culture and shared institutions, partially owing to
our mutual British heritage.  The commitment to representative government, free and independent
trade unions, individual ownership of property, and private enterprise constitutes a powerful
shared paradigm.
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See American Insurance Association (1993) for one description of the variety of operating systems on nine highly developed
nations. 
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The American Administrative Inventory is a device developed by the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI in the
United States.  It represents a detailed examination and description of the structure and performance of an individual workers’ compensation
system using a common pattern that facilitates comparison across systems. To date, AI’s have been published for 14 U.S. states and one
Canadian province. 
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In workers’ compensation sense, it is also clear that Canada, the United States, and
Australia share a good deal of common ground.  In the first place, these nations are unique in that
all have workers’ compensation systems based at the state or provincial, rather than the national
level.1  Thus, each nations’s experience is the sum of many different state of provincial systems’
experience.  While Canadian models are less diverse, it is probably true that there is as much
variety within both Australian and the United States as there is among all three countries. The
point is that our 70 state and provincial workers’ compensation models (total from Australia,
Canada, and U.S.) Have a great deal in common, as well as considerable differences.  This is
manifest in the fact that the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and
Commissions (IAIABC), the professional organizations for administrators for workers’
compensation programs, includes members from Australia, Canada, and United States. 
Apparently the administrators of the workers’ compensation system in these three countries have
had sufficient common interest to hold them in the same association.
Why British Columbia and Michigan?
The choice of British Columbia and Michigan are exemplars of “public” and
“private” workers’ compensation systems. Respectively. May not be entirely
obvious.  The first reason for their selection is familiarity.  Since the W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research had conducted administrative inventories for
each of these systems in the last five years, we had a basic familiarity with their
institutional features and operations2 (Hunt and Eccleston, 1990, Hunt, Barth, and
Leahy, 1991; Hunt, 1992).  Having the personal contacts to facilitate developing
updated information on these particular systems rapidly and efficiently was
especially important. 
However, there is more than convenience to recommend the choice of these two systems. 
British Columbia is one of only three large Canadian systems (the other are Alberta and
Saskatchewan) that are approximately fully funded today.  This represents a signal achievement
and indicates that there is something different about the system or its political setting.  More
impressively, there is evidence that this circumstance is not simply a matter of good luck.  British
Columbia stated to spiral down into large-scale deficits in the mid-1970s. Just like Ontario,
Quebec, and other Canadian systems.  (Vaillancourt, 1994) However, British Columbia turned
this situation around in the early 1980s with policy choices that restore te Workers’
Compensation Board (WCB) to financial health.  Hence, British Columbia has a workers’
compensation system that appears to be in balance and working relatively well.  Presumably, that
mean that some or all of its systems features may be viable for certain other jurisdictions. 
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Elson and Burton (1981) had calculated that Michigan workers’ compensation insurance rates for a sample of manufacturing
classification were 80 percent above U.S. average in 1978. 
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Michigan too has justification for selection as an exemplar of U.S. private market-
dominated workers’ compensation systems.  In the first place, Michigan was one of the first states
in the U.S. to implement competitive rating for workers’ compensation insurance.  This bold
commitment to the market mechanism in 1983 meant that Michigan abandoned the administered
pricing model that had dominated workers’ compensation insurance since the origins of these
systems in the early 20th century and embraced a competitive market system, which a majority of
states have since implemented to some degree.
More fundamentally, like British Columbia , the record that Michigan compiled in
reforming its workers’ compensation statute in 1980, 1981, and 1985 showed that Michigan was
willing and able to grapple with tough policy issues and arrive at sound long-term conclusions. 
(Hunt, 1986). This effort foreshadowed many similar reform movements in other states by 5 to 10
years, and was precipitated by the fact that Michigan has reached a point where the costs or
workers’ compensation was thought to be interfering with economic growth in the state.3
In addition, there are a number of characteristics of these jurisdictions that make them
interesting examples.  They are both large, significant states with substantial workers’
compensation exposure.  Although British Columbia is characterized more by primary, or
extractive, industries (fishing, logging, mining) and Michigan more by secondary, or
manufacturing, industries, they both have many employers with lots of injuries. They also both
have heavily unionized labor forces, although Michigan’s is much less influenced bu labor than a
decade ago, largely due to the downsizing of the auto industry in Michigan. 
Limitations of Exemplars
There are also some reasons why these two jurisdictions are not perfect exemplars. 
Michigan is theoretically a “wage-loss” workers’ compensation system, as opposed to an
“impairment” of “loss of wage-earning capacity” system.  This places it in a minority among U.S.
jurisdictions.  However, the “redemption” of employer liability available in the Michigan system is
both an accommodation to make the wage-loss system more workable and a feature that makes
the handling of permanent partial claims more like that in other jurisdictions.  Michigan uses a
litigation process to arrive at the partial claim more like that in other jurisdictions. 
More important, Michigan has one of the highest proportions of self-insurance in the U.S.,
due largely to the fact that the auto industry is dominated by three huge firms, General Motors,
Ford and Chrysler.  All three firms have their corporate headquarters and, especially for GM and
Chrysler, multiple large manufacturing installations in the State of Michigan.  This has produced
an environment that is “friendly” to self-insurance.  This has also been extended to included the
participation of some 9,000 small firms in 35 different industry-specific group insurance plans in
Michigan, which has increased the competitive pressure on private insurers.
5Another unique aspect of the Michigan system is the “privatization” of the competitive
state-owned Michigan Accident Fund in 1994.  The trend of the last several years in the U.S. has
been to create new competitive state funds (although no exclusive, or monopolistic, state funds
beyond the six that have existed for years).  At least six U.S. states have created new competitive
state funds in the last five years, and Michigan is the only state to be privatizing a fund.  We
regard this as an anomaly, that reflects the current Governor’s philosophical position on
government entities competing with the private market, rather than a major policy change.
While it may prove to have significant consequences in the long-run, it does not represent
a dissatisfaction with the performance of the fund as an insurance company.  In fact, it is ironic
that the Michigan Accident Fund increased its market share from 3.4 percent in 1982, the year
before open competitive rating to 15.6 percent in 1993, while remaining profitable and increasing
its net worth.  Over this decade, the fund has earned a reputation for being willing to write the
smaller risks that the large private carriers did not want to insure and did so successfully. 
British Columbia, also, is somewhat unusual among Canadian jurisdictions in that the
WCB structure also contains the Prevention Division (previously Occupational Safety and
Health).  The administrative inventory of the British Columbia system in 1991 urged the WCB to
move to exploit the potential synergy between the prevention and compensation missions in
workers’ compensation.  (Hunt, Barth, and Leahy, 1991) However, there is little evidence to date
that is being housed under the same roof provided significant performance advantages for the
WCB.  In addition, the WCB maintains their own world class worker rehabilitation center at the
central offices in Richmond.  This facility should make it possible to integrate compensation and
rehabilitation more effectively.  While this is relatively unique system feature, it only involves a
small minority of WCB claimants, so we believe it unlikely that it has a substantial impact on the
system as we will analyze it here.
Administration of Public vs. Private Workers’ Compensation Systems
In this volume, we maintain the hypothesis that, while there is no pure test of the public
vs. private workers’ compensation insurance mechanism, there are indicators of the significant
differences that underlie these fundamental scheme choices.  In other words, it would be
inaccurate to say that any given system feature is necessarily characteristics of either public or
private workers’ compensation systems.  All systems seem to be a unique blend of features that
reflect the specific socio-political-economic environment within which they were created. 
However, we still think we see some specific aspects of our exemplary systems that reflect the
underlying public/private scheme orientation that they represent.
Of course, relying on market mechanisms to organize the behavior of system actors can be
shown to provide the highest level of consumer satisfaction in conventional competitive markets
for consumption goods.  However, the private workers’ compensation insurance market has a
great many discrepancies from such a simple “perfectly-competitive” model.  The lack of good
information on both sides of the market, agent-principal problems of administering a program
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(insurance carrier) for a group of beneficiaries (injured workers) on behalf of another party
(employer), public interest in guaranteeing certain outcomes, and many divergences from the
perfect competition model exist.  Some of the market imperfections, and the way they are dealt
with, will be discussed below. 
While economists (including authors) have great respect for the unfettered market as an
optimal resource allocation mechanism, the particular example of workers’ compensation
insurance does not yield to simple, knee-jerk judgements of the superiority of private markets. 
Traditional neo-classical economic analysis leads to the judgement that compensating wage
differentials that arise from free and unfettered labor markets should be sufficient to optimize the
social level of occupational injury and, perhaps, illness.4  However, we know of no example where
the market has been left completely alone to solve this social problem.  Societies have seen fit to
interfere in the market solution in one way or another, to one degree or another, in pursuit of
what becomes a political-social-economic solution.  This is certainly true of workers’
compensation systems we will examine here.
We believe that private market forces can be constrained to serve public goals in this case,
without automatically leading to sub-optimal social outcomes.  In one sense, the entire history of
workers’ compensation programs reflects the political judgement that the unfettered market
solution (compensating wage differentials combines with employer’s tort liability) was not an
efficient or effective remedy to the problem of compensating injured workers for injuries sustained
in the course of their employment. The political authority of the state found in the late 19th century
that the tort solution to these increasingly frequent events was not sufficient.  Thus, the very
origin of workers’ compensation programs at the dawn of the 20th century can be sais to reflect
interference with market forces. 
Some economists would have us seek a market solution to this problem, but this volume
maintains an agnostic view.  We seek to describe the institutions and probe the system
performance for two exemplary workers’ compensation systems in North America, one
predominantly public, the other predominantly private.  We attempt to distill from this
examination some policy lessons that relate to specific mix of public and private workers’
compensation institutions that may prove relevant to other jurisdictions, including Victoria.  
Obviously, the selection of a particular workers’ compensation insurance mechanism has
broad implications for the administration of the system.  The difference between public and
private workers’ compensation systems in North America seems to constitute a choice between
direct system administration by a public entity (as in Canada and those U.S. jurisdictions with
“exclusive” state funds) or a market regulatory approach to system administration (as in Michigan
and most other U.S. jurisdictions).  For example, in British Columbia the public administrative
agent (WCB) makes all benefit payments and is directly responsible for making them correctly and
promptly.  In Michigan, the public administrative agent Bureau of Workers’ Disability
Compensation (BWDC) is responsible for monitoring the performance of private insurance
7carriers and self-insured employers in making such payments correctly and promptly.  These are
two very different roles and have different staffing and performance monitoring requirements. 
This accounts for the emphasis on regulation in U.S. jurisdictions, which is almost unknown in
Canada.
The adjudication, termination, and re-opening of claims provide additional examples.  In
British Columbia, all these are he responsibility of the WCB and the staff they employ for this
purpose.  Fundamentally the public entity is determining whether benefits are payable in a given
instance, based on statutory, policy, and legal interpretive superstructure.  In Michigan, private
decision makers are deciding these things, with recourse to the dispute resolution procedures
provided by the public entity in the event of a difference of opinion.  However, it is fundamentally
different for employers to have the right to seize the initiative, subject to a subsequent legal
challenge, as in Michigan from having to secure the basic decision from a public entity as in
British Columbia.  Again, these administrative arrangements have manifold implications for
worker and employer client satisfaction with the system.  
This also applies to the appellate dimension.  In the British Columbia system, appeal
procedures allow workers and employers to seek from alleged errors by the public decision
maker.  Thus, the matter of the independence of appellate bodies has assumed great importance in
Canada.  In Michigan, by contrast, appeal procedures settle differences between private parties in
interpretation of law or fact.  Presumably, this is the reason for greater interest in, and utilization
of, alternative dispute resolution procedures like mediation and arbitration in the Michigan
system.  Fundamentally, the interest if the public body is to secure an agreement between the
private parties within the confines of the statutory and regulatory environment.  
One area where we do not observe fundamental differences is in the approach to
prevention of workplace injuries and illnesses.  Both Michigan and British Columbia follow a 3-
pronged approach of incentives, regulation, and education to promote occupational safety and
health.  Prevention incentives are embedded in the workers’ compensation systems in the
institution of experience rating for the premiums of individual employers, with their costs of
insurance coverage varying with the number and cost of their claims.  While there is greater scope
for variation in premiums do to experience rating and other risk sensitive pricing adjustments in
Michigan than in British Columbia, the institution is fundamentally the same.  
In addition, both British Columbia and Michigan have aggressive regulatory approaches to
occupational safety and health.  Inspectors from the public sector visit and evaluate workplaces
based on a set of standards, with punitive or remedial actions resulting.  In addition, both
programs utilize voluntary consulting and education program to raise the awareness of prevention
as a fundamental issue.  The fact that the administrative agent for the workers’ compensation
system (WCB) in British Columbia also administers this program, while in Michigan it is a
separate agency (Bureau of Safety and Regulation) does not appear to have significant
programmatic implications, although in theory it could. 
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Finally, there is a significant difference in what might be called the collective, “voice” of
the workers’ compensation system.  In the most basic sense, including private insurers in the
workers’ compensation system means that there is another powerful set of stakeholders whose
interest will be defended.  In British Columbia, the administrative agent (WCB) speaks for the
system as a whole in a way that would be completely unacceptable in Michigan.  While statutory
initiatives form stakeholder interest groups are not unknown, they have been relatively rare in
British Columbia, and are subject to examination and endorsement by the public body.  In
contrast, the multiplicity of stakeholders and their unique individual versions of “the truth” serve
to fragment and confuse public opinion and statutory initiatives in Michigan and other U.S.
jurisdictions.  Frankly, it is difficult to determine what the public interest is under such a regime.
Only in the state of Wisconsin does this problem seem to have been permanently averted,
by recourse to the institution of a Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council, which serves as a
deliberative body to forge consensus recommendations from employer and worker stakeholder
groups. 5
The council meets as needed to study legislative proposals submitted by labor,
management and the division (public administrative agent), and to hold public
hearings...Council members reach agreement on proposed legislation through a
series of meetings, public hearings, and negotiations, culminating in the submission
of a single bill to the assembly and senate labor committees of the state legislature. 
To date, bills submitted bu the council have been passed virtually unchanged. 
(Ballantyne and Telles, 1992, pp. 10-11)
However, there is nothing magical about the institution of an advisory council itself, since it has
been tried in other jurisdictions without achieving the same remarkable status of respect from
legislators that seems to be enjoyed in Wisconsin.  Further, the suspension of the Governing
Board of the WCB in British Columbia in the summer of 1995 raises the issue of whether the
political authority will continue to allow the WCB to “speak for the workers’ compensation
system.  Certainly, it has become obvious that there has been a change in the degree to which all
stakeholders in British Columbia share the same set of assumptions about system structure and
performance. 
Core Workers’ Compensation Insurance System Functions
Since a major focus of this report is the way that the public and private workers’    
compensation insurance systems actually work, significant attention will be paid to the core
functions of such an insurance system.  Table 1.1 lays out the general principles of the public
monopoly and private market models that will be treated here.  While minimum workers’
compensation benefit provisions are always specified by law, the exact insurance policy “design”
features can vary substantially in the private market case.  In all cases, statutes specify minimum
benefits for injured workers and assign the financial responsibility for those benefits to the
6
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employer, individually or collectively.  However, private insurers have proven to be more
innovative in meeting the perceived needs of their customers.
This is vividly manifest in the rush to managed care in the U.S. workers’ compensation
market over the past five years.  Each insurance company has developed its own version of
managed care and touts it as superior to all others.  British Columbia, on the other hand, has just
begun to discuss the possibilities inherent in such systems.6  It eems clear that this is a difference
deriving from the competitive versus monopoly character of the workers’ compensation insurance
market. 
Marketing differs significantly between public monopoly and private market systems.  In
British Columbia, virtually every employee must have workers’ compensation coverage, and there
is only one source.  In Michigan, there are over 100 insurance groups aggressively competing for
the employer-consumers’ business.  While this competitive process insures more choice for the
employer-consumer, it does not necessarily assure that the right choice is made for the workers. 
Therefore, the insurance regulatory function seeks to guarantee “adequate” performance by he
carriers, i.e., to prevent excessive downward pressure on benefit payments.  In addition, the
marketing function must be funded out of policy revenues, and this is not a trivial cost to be
absorbed, as we will see later.
Marketing differs very significantly of underwriting selection, the public monopoly model
essentially offers no choice; all employers who require coverage are automatically part of the
system.  Under the private market model, insurers have a choice of who they want to insure.  This
is the obverse side of the marketing coin.  Insurers want to insure “good risks,” and they seek to
avoid “poor risks.”  Bu there is also a more subtle selection process that insurers use to find risks
that “fit” their prices.  This means there is room for different underwriting strategies.  In fact,
some insurance carriers devote a great deal of time and effort to selecting the risks they want to
insure, believing that this guarantees better results.  So underwriting selection as it affects the
availability of coverage is a major public policy concern in a private market system, because
workers’ compensation coverage is guaranteed to all workers, regardless of their likelihood of
being injured.
Pricing/premium verification refers to the dual functions of setting the price for insurance
coverage and verifying that employers are being charged the appropriate price.  Again, this is a
universal concern and must be provided by either a public monopoly or a private market system,
but the range of pricing schemes available to an insurer may depend on its competition and the
regulatory authority.  The case is similar with loss prevention services.  In most public monopoly
systems, workers’ compensation or another agency provide loss prevention services to employer
clients.  However, the loss prevention incentives employed by private insurers are likely to
produce greater effort, since a major avenue to increased profits in a competitive system is cost
reduction.  This is offset by concerns that then private incentives also produce behaviors designed
to fight claim, which is thought to less typical of public systems. 
7 The Ontario WCB accumulated a deficit of approximately $12 billion (CD) during the decade of the 1980s. 
10
Claims adjustments and case management services would show little difference between a
public monopoly and private market system, except insofar as the potential for cost reduction in
the private system seems again to focus the attention of the insurer on reducing expenditures as
opposed to making sure the injured worker receives benefit to which he/she is entitled.
There is no necessary difference in the statistical function, although in practice some
additional statistical reporting may be necessary in private, regulated systems to monitor insurer
performance and compliance with the statute.  Public monopoly workers’ compensation systems
generally perform their own data collection and analysis, whereas private market systems
generally use private statistical agents (who also must be regulated) to pool data across insurers,
with the result that access to system data is usually restricted because of competitive concerns. 
Consequently, workers’ compensation administrative agencies in private market systems tend to
have their own statistical systems, although far less comprehensive that those in public systems.  
The availability of insurance coverage is a major issue for private market systems.  As
indicated in the underwriting selection discussion, private insurers are generally not compelled to
write policies for all comers.  The result in private market systems is that some employers are left
outside the voluntary market and must provide coverage through some other system, generally a
residual market or state fund.  This creates equity problems among employers, among insurance
carriers, and potentially among injured workers.  It can also impose additional administrative costs
and other inefficiencies on the workers’ compensation system.  Severe residual market problems
can even drive a workers’ compensation system into crisis, as happened in Maine in the early
1990s.
Finally, the solvency of the system must be assured.  Mechanisms mut be provided to
guarantee that the means to pay future benefits to injured workers will be safeguarded.  In the
event of and insurer, or self-insured employer, bankruptcy, the payment of the future benefits to
injured workers must be assured.  There are similar issues for public systems, of course,
particularly regarding the adequacy of reserves for future benefit commitments.  Public insurers
can be underfunded and accumulate huge deficits, which must be eventually be resolved.7  While
we are not aware of any public insurer that has ultimately failed to pay its claims obligations, the
measures that may eventually be implemented to restore solvency could have significant equity
effects on both employers and workers.
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Market Failures
In theory, regulation is designed to address market failures that would otherwise impair
economic performance and reduce social welfare.  The purpose of regulation is to correct market
failures, or at least minimize their negative effects, and improve allocative efficiency.  The
principal market imperfections that regulation is intended to address are: barriers to entry and exit;
externalities, where transactions create cost for third parties; and internalities, i.e., cost and
benefits of transactions that are not reflected in the terms of exchange (Spulber, 1989).  To
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correct or counteract these problems, regulators may impose controls on entry, exit, process,
product quality, inputs to production, refusal to serve, and other private activities. 
Insurance markets, including workers’ compensation, are subject to several types of
market failures that insurance regulators seek to counteract.  The principal market failure that led
to insurance regulations in the U.S. is the problem of excessive risk of insurer insolvency that
derives from inefficiencies created by costly information and agent-principal problems (Munch and
Smallwood, 1981).  Owners of insurance companies have diminished incentives to maintain a high
level of safety to the extent that their personal assets are not a risk for unfunded obligations to
policyholders caused by insolvency.
It is costly for consumers to properly assess an insurers’ financial strength in relation to its
prices and quality of service.  Insurers also can increase their risk after policyholders have
purchased a policy and paid premiums.  Thus, in the absence of regulation, imperfect consumer
information and agency problems would result in an excessive number of insolvencies.  Solvency
regulation is intended to limit the degree of insolvency risk in accordance with society’s
preference for safety.  This regulatory function is considered to be particularly important for
workers’ compensation, to guarantee that injured workers will receive the benefits to which they
are entitled.
One of regulators’ concerns is that insurers’ incentives to take on excessive financial risk
and even engage in “go-for-broke” strategies may result in inadequate reserves and prices.  Some
consumers will buy insurance from low-price carriers without properly considering the greater
financial risk involved.  This potential is exacerbated for third-party liability lines such as workers’
compensation where employers may seek to escape their obligations to workers by declaring
bankruptcy in the event of their insurer’s insolvency.  The regulatory concern is that poor
incentives for safety could induce a wave of “destructive competition” in which all insurers are
forced to cut their prices below costs to maintain their market position.  Thus, it is argued that
regulators must impose some degree of discipline by placing a floor under prices to prevent the
market from imploding.
At the same time, circumstances may arise where consumer search costs can impede
competition and lead to excessive prices and profits (Varian, 1992).  Further, imperfect
information and unequal bargaining power between insurer and consumers can make consumers
vulnerable to misleading marketing and claims practices of insurer and agents.  It also has been
suggested that it is costly for insurers to ascertain consumers’ risk characteristics accurately,
giving an informational advantage to insures already entrenched in a market and creating barriers
to entry that diminish competition (Cummins and Danzon, 1991).  Under these circumstances,
regulators may seek to enforce a ceiling that will prevent prices from rising above a competitive
level and to protect consumers against unfair market prices.  
The tension between insurers’ tendencies to either underprice or overprice insurance
coverage may contribute to the cyclical pricing behavior that is observed in commercial
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property/casualty insurance lines, such as workers’ compensation.  This phenomenon is commonly
termed the “property/casualty underwriting cycle.”  It is apparent that, over time, workers’
compensation and other commercial insurance prices in the U.S. have moved up and down in
relation to loss costs in alternating “hard” and “soft” markets.
The conventional wisdom is that this cycle behavior us caused by “cash-flow
underwriting,: i.e., insurers cut prices below costs to increase their market share and rely on cash
flows from premiums and investment income to sustain their operations, causing a “soft market.” 
However, losses eventually mount as claims are paid, causing insurers to retrench, tighten their
underwriting, and raise prices, which leads to a “hard-market.”  The resulting improvement in
profits established the conditions for another soft market, and the cycle is perpetuated.
Some analysts have challenged this explanation of the underwriting cycle suggests other
casual factors such as movements in interest rates and loss shocks (see Cummins, Harrington, and
Klein, 1991).  While these alternative theories are supported by empirical evidence, there appears
to be a residual “behavioral” component to cyclical patterns in commercial insurance pricing and
underwriting that defies explanation simply by changes in external economic variables.  This
cyclicality can increase uncertainty and instability for employers in terms of the availability and
cost of workers’ compensation coverage.  Workers also may be adversely affected to the extent
that market cycles influence insurers’ quality of service.  
Potential agent-principal problems raise other issues with respect to reliance on private
markets to finance and deliver workers’ compensation insurance.  Private insurers, employers, and
workers have different interests and incentives.  Workers seek to maximize their wages and
benefits, while employers and insurers seek to maximize their profits.  Statutory provisions
governing workers’ compensation benefits necessarily leave some room for interpretation and
application by insurers to specific claims.  Insurers can increase profits by minimizing workers’
compensation benefit payments if it serves to lower their workers’ compensation premiums and
total labor costs.  
In theory, workers’ ability yo bargain for wages and other benefits should impose some
check on employers’ and insurers’ inclinations to “low-ball” workers’ compensation benefit
payments.  However, in practice it is costly and difficult for workers and employers to monitor
and control insurers’ claims adjustment practices.  Workers are unlikely to choose to leave an
employer on the basis of its workers’ compensation carrier, and an injured worker must engage in
costly litigation if the worker cannot reach an agreement with the carrier on the payment of the
claim.   Consequently, under a system where workers’ compensation benefits are privately
financed, workers’ interests may be compromised without regulatory protections.  
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard also plague insurance markets,
including workers’ compensation, and induce insurers to reject some risks and limit the coverage
provided to others (Borch, 1990).  Adverse selection refers to the greater tendency of high-risk
individuals to seek insurance, particularly if the premium they would pay is less than their
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expected loss.  Workers’ compensation insurers are subject to adverse selection unless they are
able to reject high-risk employers or charge them a rate commensurate with their higher risk. 
Insurers subject to adverse selection are forced to increase their prices to cover higher loss costs,
which, in turn, leads to further concentration of high-risk employers among these insurers.  Low-
risk employers will be discouraged from buying insurance from insurers charging premiums hat
exceed the employers’ expected loss costs.  Insurers attempt to avoid adverse selection by
coordinating their selection of risks and pricing so that every risk they insure is charged an
adequate rate.  This is the reason for insurance groups, with different companies and different
prices designed for market segments.  However, this can lead to situations where some employers
are unable to obtain workers’ compensation insurance through the voluntary market.
Moral hazard occurs when insurance diminished an insured’s incentive to prevent or
contain losses.  Insurers counteract moral hazard by offering less than full coverage and using an
employer’s previous loss experience as a rating factor.  Partial coverage is an issue in workers’
compensation because of the concern that injured workers may become a burden to society,
particularly if they fail to receive the benefits due them form the employer/insurer.  Consequently,
in the U.S., workers. Compensation policies are structured so that insurers pay full benefits to
workers and seek reimbursement from employers for any residual portion of benefit costs for
which the employer are responsible.
Plan of Presentation
As we describe these two exemplary workers’ compensation systems, we will utilize a
common framework.  This comes from the desire to provide consistent descriptions of the two
systems in spite of the considerable differences in details between them.  After giving a picture of
the general administrative organization of the workers’ compensation system, wee will describe
the claims administration process.  This will be followed by a discussion of the benefits provided
to injured workers.  Then the dispute resolution mechanisms employed will be described, followed
by a discussion of the incentives implicit in the system.  This thumbnail sketch should be sufficient
to give a flavor of the day-to-day operations of the systems, as they are experienced by injured
workers, employers, and providers.
Next, the insurance models will be examined in separate selections.  There is less
consistency in the treatment here, because there is not much in common.  The British Columbia
section will describe the assessment structure and function at the WCB.  Then some specific
policy issues will be considered, including self-insurance, experience rating, and protection for
extremely small risks.  Last, the two basic performance issues of revenue sufficiency and cross-
subsidization among classes of employers will be discussed.
The Michigan analysis is more formal and utilizes a structure-conduct-performance model
to examine the Michigan insurance mechanism.  This discussion should be particularly valuable in
identifying the issues and possible outcomes form different approaches to privatizing various
workers’ compensation functions.  While this discussion focuses primarily on Michigan, it draws
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on other jurisdiction where needed, ans uses U.S. averages as bases of compensation coverage,
and administrative cost levels are all considered.
The final section of the report extends our analysis to consider some policy implication o
alternative approaches to public and private provisions of the core workers;’ compensation system
functions.  Based on the underlying framework of the report and prior analysis, we discussed the
potential outcomes of the options available to policy makers in structuring the public and private
sector roles in a workers’ compensation system.  This discussion also considers the
interrelationship among the policy choices for administering measures in Victoria without a
detailed study of its system features and environment, we do offer some observation on possible
outcomes for policy makers in Victoria to assist in considering options for privatization.
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Table 1.1 Core Workers’ Compensation Insurance Functions
Core Functions Public Monopoly Model Private Market Model
Benefit provisions and policy
design
Uniform benefits and coverages
set by law
L w established uniform
benefits and basic coverages
but insurers may vary services
and risk sharing with employer
Marketing/distribution Limited policy issuance
activities performed by agency
Competition among private
insurers necessitates marketing
and distributions efforts and
commissions/salaries to agents
Underwriting selection Employers are automatically
part of he system
Insurers evaluate and can
refuse to accept certain risks
Pricing/premium verificationAgency administers uniform
price and cost allocation
Insurers determine prices and
audit premiums governed by
competition with limited
regulatory oversight




Performed by agency Performed by insurers and third
party administrators
Statistical reporting Not an issue in public systemFunction shared by agency and
private statistical agents
appointed by regulators
Availability guarantee Not an issue in public systemResidual market mechanism
administered by state or private
entity under regulatory
supervision
Solvency protection Not needed in public systemSolvency regulated and claims
obligations insured by private
association of private insurers
